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The Basel Convention: Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal
By KATHLEEN HOWARD*
Member of the Class of 1991
I. INTRODUCION
Hazardous waste export is on the rise due to increasingly stringent
legislation in major waste producing countries.I The export of hazardous
wastes has resulted in a number of serious accidents with worldwide ef-
fects.2 Few countries currently have regulatory schemes governing trans-
boundary movements of hazardous wastes. Those countries which do
have such schemes often find the legislation ineffective in the face of
widespread circumvention efforts.3
The United States currently has a "notice and consent" system regu-
lating the export of hazardous wastes.' Under this system, hazardous
waste exporters must receive consent from the importing country prior to
transfer of the wastes.' The European Community (EO) has a similar
system of "notice and authorization. '"6 Among less developed countries,
however, there are few regulations governing the export or import of
hazardous wastes.7
* B.S., University of Colorado, Boulder, 1988.
1. Atkinson, Control of Hazardous Waste Exports, 16 BARRISTER 46,47 (1989).
2. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANS-
FRONTIER MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
(1985).
3. See Id.
4. Resource Conservation Recovery Act, § 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. 1990). See
infra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. 1990).
6. Directive on the Supervision and Control Within the European Community of the Tran-
sfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste, 27 OJ. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 326) 31 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter EC Directive].
7. See I. VALLETrE, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WASTEs: A GREENPEACE IN-
VENTORY (4th ed. 1989) (prepared for the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical
Experts with a Mandate to Prepare a Global Convention on Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes).
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Recent waste trade incidents illustrate the imminent problems of
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. One serious illegal
waste trade incident was documented after a chemical plant in Seveso,
Italy, exploded in 1976. Contractors allegedly transported within Italy a
large amount of hazardous wastes created by the Seveso explosion.8 Af-
ter shipping, however, the wastes could not be located. 9 Seven years
later, Greenpeace members discovered forty-one barrels of the dioxin-
contaminated wastes generated by the Seveso explosion in a barn in San
Quentin, France.°
Another serious international hazardous waste trade incident in-
volved the world's most heavily traveled waste trading vessel, the Khian
Sea." Between August 1986 and November 1988, the Khian Sea trav-
ersed the Caribbean seeking a dump site for toxic incinerator ash which
had originated in Philadelphia.12 The ship carried the incinerator ash to
five continents and was refused specifically by Panama, the Bahamas,
Bermuda, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras.1 3 Finally, in October
1987 Haiti's Department of Commerce agreed to dispose of the incinera-
tor ash.14 However, once Greenpeace alerted Haiti to the potential
hazards in disposal of the wastes, Haiti rescinded its permit. 15 By the
time of the rescission, the Khian Sea had spread an estimated 3000 tons
of ash on a northern Haitian beach. 6 Tests showed high levels of cad-
mium, arsenic, mercury, and dioxins at the site."7 These hazardous
wastes can contaminate drinking water supplies and cause kidney mal-
functions, respiratory difficulties, or death."8
When the ship docked in Singapore in November 1988 its cargo
holds were empty. 19 The wastes disappeared somewhere between Haiti
and Singapore. There is speculation that the captain of the Khian Sea
dumped the ash in the Indian Ocean near the southern China coast or on
8. Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the System of International Controls,
19 ENVTL. L. REV. 10171, 10172 (1989).
9. Id.
10. Id. The EC Directive was adopted as a result of this discovery.
11. [2 No. 4] GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE 12 (H. Spalding, A. Leonard, & 3.
Vallette eds. 1989) [hereinafter [2 No. 4] GREENPEACE UPDATE).
12. Id. See also L.A. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, § A, at 6, col. 1.
13. Millman, Exporting Hazardous Waste, TECH. REV., Apr. 6, 1989, at 6, 7,
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id
16. Id. See also [2 No. 4] GREENPEACE UPDATE, supra note 11, at 13.
17. Millman, supra note 13, at 7.
18. S. EPSTEIN, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 27 (1982).
19. Millman, supra note 13, at 7. See also [2 No. 4] GREENPEACE UPDATE, supra note 11,
at 13; J. VALLETTE, supra note 7, at 13.
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sparsely populated islands near the Bay of Bengal3 °
The Seveso and Khian Sea incidents were well-publicized, unsuc-
cessful waste trade endeavors. Greenpeace argues that many similar
waste trade schemes are not brought to public attention, and has com-
piled an inventory of international waste trades.2" According to Green-
peace and the Environmental Policy Institute, hazardous waste
shipments from North America and Western Europe exceeded three mil-
lion tons between 1986 and 1989.1 Even the U.S. Department of Envi-
ronment, Health, and Natural Resources agrees that no one knows how
much waste is actually being exported.23
Despite these accidents and the increase in export of hazardous
waste in recent years,24 few countries have domestic hazardous waste im-
port or export regulations.' As the amount of exported hazardous
wastes increases, the potential for a significant international crisis also
increases. An international agreement is desperately needed to guard
against the improper handling of hazardous wastes.
Concerned by the unchecked transboundary movements of hazard-
ous wastes, 116 nations met in Basel, Switzerland, in March 1989 under
the guidance of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
2 6
The delegation authored the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (the
Convention).27 The Convention provides a system to regulate the ship-
ment of hazardous wastes across international borders. Through strin-
gent requirements for export agreements and extensive monitoring of the
20. See [2 No. 4] GREENPFACE UPDATE, supra note 11, at 13.
21. See J. VALLETrE, supra note 7.
22. Waste Export Control: Heating on HR. 2525 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 156 (1989) [hereinafter Waste Export Control] (statements of Jim Vallette, International
Waste Trade Project Coordinator, Greenpeace, and Alex I-little, International Coordinator,
Environmental Policy Institute, Friends of the Earth, and the Oceanic Society).
23. Id. at 55 (statement of William A. Nitze, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Dep't of State).
24. Id. at 47 (statement of Scott A. Hajost, Acting Associate Administrator for Interna-
tional Activities, Environmental Protection Agency).
25. Id. at 24 (statement of John Conyers, Jr., Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan).
26. UNEP was created by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII) of
15 December 1972, G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR (2112th plan. mtg.), U.N. Doc. Al8901
(1972), and is responsible for catalyzing, coordinating, and stimulating environmental action
within the UN system. Rublack, Controlling Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste:
The Evolution of a Global Convention, 13 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 113, 117 (1989).
27. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, 22 March 1989, U.N. Environmental Programme (Agenda Item 3), U.N.
Doc. UNEP/Z/6 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention].
1990]
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movements of hazardous wastes, UNEP hopes to control international
hazardous waste transport.28
The Convention remained open for signature until March 22, 1990,
one year after drafting.2 9 As of that date, fifty-seven nations have signed
the Convention. 30 Five nations-Hungary, Norway, Jordan, Switzer-
land, and Saudi Arabia-have ratified the Convention at this time.31 The
Convention will go into force ninety days after ratification by any twenty
signatories.32
UNEP's Executive Director, Mr. Mostafa K. Tolba, is confident
that the Convention will go into force because over 100 of the countries
in attendance signed the Final Act. The Act summarizes the proceedings
and declares that the participants adopted the Convention as written.
33
Although the Final Act is not a legally binding document, Tolba argues
that signing it manifests the signatories' acceptance of the Convention's
general principles.34
Despite Tolba's confidence in ratification, some proponents of the
Convention are concerned that the major producers of hazardous wastes
will not ratify the Convention.35 The United States is the largest waste
producer in the world, but has not yet ratified the Convention. Proposed
legislation that would have implemented the Convention has been pend-
ing in Congress for nearly a year.36
Opponents of the Convention feel that its provisions are not strin-
gent enough and can be easily circumvented. 37 International organiza-
tions such as Greenpeace, the National Resources Defense Council, and
28. O'Sullivan, International Controls on Transport, Disposal of Wastes Agreed Upon,
CHEM. & ENG'G NEws, Apr. 3, 1989, at 21.
29. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 25, para. 2, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 675, 677
(1989).
30. The signatories include Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Fin-
land, France, German Federal Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Switzerland, the European
Community Commission, Hungary, Canada, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico,
Panama, Syria, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland. M.2 BOWMAN & D.2 HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND
CURRENT STATUS 61 (Seventh Cumulative Supp. 1990).
31. I




35. Handley, supra note 8, at 10181.
36. See Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 55 (statement of William A. Nitze).
37. [2 No. 3] GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE 3 (A. Leonard & J. Vallette eds,
1989) [hereinafter [2 No. 3] GREENPEACE UPDATE].
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the Organization of African Unity want a complete ban on the export of
hazardous wastes." Opponents also point out potential problems with
enforcing the Convention as well as possible loopholes due to vague tex-
tual language.3 9
This Note discusses the provisions of the Convention and considers
the key criticisms put forth by its opponents. The Note then reviews
current United States regulations for transboundary movements of haz-
ardous wastes, focusing on those differences between U.S. law and the
Convention's provisions which are preventing United States ratification.
After considering arguments for and against the Convention, the Note
proposes that certain provisions of the Convention be eliminated to allow
the possibility of a complete ban on all transboundary movements of haz-
ardous wastes and to prevent circumvention of the Convention. In addi-
tion, vague language used in drafting the Convention should be precisely
defined to ensure that the Convention's goals are achieved. Although the
Convention is imperfect, it is an effective starting point for regulating
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, and should be ratified by
all of its signatories, including the United States.
II. THE CONVENTION'S KEY PROVISIONS
Article 1 establishes the scope of the Convention. The Convention's
provisions apply to hazardous as well as other wastes. The list includes
twenty-seven waste constituents commonly considered hazardous.4°
Wastes deemed hazardous include pharmaceutical products, biocides,
organic solvents, cyanides, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's),4
polybrominated biphenyls (PBB's),42 photographic chemicals, and chem-
38. Id.
39. See M. Gade, Exporting Trouble: The Case for a Total U.S. Ban on Hazardous Waste
Exports 12-16 (paper presented at the Oct. 27, 1989, Conference of the Canadian Council of
International Law in Ottawa, Ontario) (Mary Gade is the Acting Deputy Assistant Adminis-
trator for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
40. These constituents include metal carbonyls, beryllium, hexavalent chromium, copper,
zinc, arsenic, selenium, cadmium, antimony, tellurium, mercury, thallium, lead, inorganic
flourine, inorganic cyanides, acidic solutions, basic solutions, asbestos, organic phosphorous,
organic cyanides, phenols, ethers, halogenated organic solvents, other organic solvents, conge-
nors of polychlorinated dibenzo-furan or dibenzo-p-dioxin, and other organohalogen com-
pounds. ML
41. Polycblorinated Biphenyls (PCB's) are used primarily in commercial industrial prod-
ucts. All PCB's belong to a class of halogenated aromatic hydrocarbons which are foreign to
biologic systems and are generally carcinogenic Letz, The Toxicology ofPCB's - An Oyeryiew
for Clinicians, 138 WJ. MED. 534 (1983).
42. Polybrominated biphenyls (PBB's) are produced by tacking bromine onto particular
hydrocarbons known as phenols, resulting in a highly toxic but effective flame retardant. S.
EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 23-24.
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ical substances arising from research and development activities whose
effects on humans or the environment are unknown.43 Article 1 also de-
fines hazardous wastes as wastes which the domestic legislation of the
exporter, importer, or transit state deems hazardous."
Article 1 exempts the waste streams and waste constituents listed
above unless they are characterized as explosive, flammable, spontane-
ously combustible, oxidizable, poisonous, infectious, corrosive, toxic, or
ecotoxic. 45 Radioactive materials are expressly excluded from the Con-
vention.46 The exclusion of radioactive wastes was the subject of much
debate and its adoption was allegedly a result of pressure from the
United States. Regulation of these wastes will be determined by the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency.47 Wastes discharged from ships are
also expressly excluded from the scope of the Convention because they
are regulated by domestic ocean dumping laws.4 8
The term "other wastes" is defined in annex II as household wastes
and residues arising from the incineration of household wastes.
49
Although these wastes are not considered hazardous under the Conven-
tion, they are subject to the same regulations as are hazardous wastes. 0
Article 2 of the Convention limits the definition of wastes.51 It also
defines the environmentally sound mianagement of hazardous or other
wastes.52 In limiting the definition of hazardous wastes, paragraph 1 of
article 2 defines wastes as substances which are or are intended to be
disposed. 3 Disposal is by definition limited to operations which do not
43. Basel Convention, supra note 27, annex I, at 78-79, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 678-79
(1989). Also included in the list are waste streams from wood preserving chemicals,
polychlorinated triphenyls, surface treatment of metals and plastics, industrial waste disposal
operations, and wastes of an explosive nature not subject to other legislation. rd
44. Id art. 1, para. l(b), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 659 (1989).
45. Id. art. 1, para. l(a) & annex III, at 41, 80-81, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 659, 679-81
(1989).
46. Id art. 1, para. 3, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 659 (1989). See also Greenhouse, UN,
Conference Supports Curbs on Exporting of Hazardous Waste, NY. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at
B1l, col. 2.
47. Greenhouse, supra note 46, at BI 1, col. 2.
48. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 1, para. 4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 659
(1989).
49. Id. art. 1, para. 2 & annex II, at 41, 79, reprinted in 28 [.L.M. 657, 659, 679 (1989),
50. These wastes are not considered "hazardous" because they generally do not contrib-
ute to an increase in mortality or serious illness. This Note uses the term "other wastes" as
defined in the Convention.
51. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 659-60
(1989) (" 'Wastes' are substances or objects which are disposed of or are intended to be dis-
posed of or are required to be disposed of by the provisions of national law..
52. Id. art. 2, para. 8, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 675, 660 (1989).
53. Id. art. 2, para. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 659-60 (1989).
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lead to the possibility of resource recovery, recycling, reclamation, direct
re-use, or alternative uses.' Thus, any substances transported for recov-
ery, recycling, or reclamation are exempt from the provisions of the
Convention.55
Paragraph 5 addresses the problem of differing definitions of hazard-
ous wastes. If a proposed transboundary movements of wastes is not
defined as hazardous in the state of export, but is legally defined as haz-
ardous in the state of import or in any of the states of transit, the wastes
are subject to the Convention. 6
All hazardous waste transfers under the Convention must be man-
aged in an environmentally sound manner. Article 2 defines the
"[e]nvironmentally sound management of hazardous wastes" as "taking
all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are
managed in a manner which will protect human health and the environ-
ment against the adverse effects which may result from such wastes."5"
Article 4, paragraph 8, however, mandates that technical guidelines for
the environmentally sound management of wastes be decided by the par-
ties transferring the waste at their first meeting.58 Therefore, the parties
determine what constitutes environmentally sound management, not the
Convention.59
Under the Convention, parties to hazardous waste transfers are re-
quired to comply with a number of obligations concerning their produc-
tion and transfer of wastes. Parties also must comply with notice and
consent provisions for the transfer, and agreements to re-import wastes
that are not managed in an environmentally sound manner after a trans-
fer." Article 4 sets forth the parties' general obligations and contains the
Convention's key regulatory provisions.6' Section 2(a) of article 4 re-
quires parties to ensure that their generation of hazardous and other
wastes is reduced to a minimum.62 Tolba, Secretary of UNEP, believes
54. Id. annex IV, § A, at 83, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 681 (1989). See also id. annex IV,
§ B, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 682 (1989).
55. M. Gade, supra note 39, at 17.
56. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 6, para. 5, reprinted in 28 I.LM. 657, 681
(1989).
57. Id. art. 2, para. 8, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 660 (1989).
58. Id. art. 4, para. 8, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 663 (1989). For purposes of this Note, a
party is a country that has ratified the Convention and is engaged in a hazardous waste trans-
fer. The Convention does not specify when this first meeting is to take place, nor how the
parties should reach this agreement.
59. Id.
60. Id art. 8, at 52, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 666 (1989).
61. Id. art. 4, at 45-47, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 661-62 (1989).
62. Id. art. 4, para. 2(a), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 662 (1989) ('Each Party shall take
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that the Convention will achieve this ultimate goal.6 3 Critics argue, how-
ever, that minimization of waste generation will not be met unless a
stronger international agreement is enacted. 4
The Convention entirely prohibits transfer of hazardous wastes in a
number of situations. Section 2 of article 4 prohibits hazardous waste
export to parties that have prohibited the import of hazardous wastes.6 5
This provision is critical because it allows for a de facto total ban on the
export of hazardous wastes. If all countries in attendance signed the
Convention and individually banned the import of hazardous wastes, a
complete ban would effectively be achieved. Currently, more than forty
nations ban the import of all hazardous wastes.66
The Convention also prohibits import or export of wastes when a
party to the agreement has reason to believe that the transported wastes
will not be managed in an environmentally sound manner.67 This re-
quirement obligates both the importer and exporter to ensure environ-
mentally sound management of the transported wastes.68 The
Convention emphasizes that the exporter may not transfer its duty to
ensure environmentally sound management of wastes to the importer or
to transit states under any circumstances.69
Similarly, all parties are obligated to ensure the availability of ade-
quate domestic disposal facilities for environmentally sound management
of wastes. 70 The Convention does not, however, define the term "ade-
the appropriate measure to: (a) [e]nsure that the generation of hazardous wastes and other
wastes within it is reduced to a minimum, taking into account social, technological and eco-
nomic aspects...").
63. Tolba stated that "[t]he ultimate goal is to make the movements of hazardous waste so
costly and difficult that industry will find it more profitable to cut down on waste production
and reuse or recycle what waste they produce." O'Sullivan, supra note 28, at 21.
64. See infra notes 95-188 and accompanying text.
65. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 4, para. 2(e), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 662
(1989).
66. J. VALLETTE, supra note 7, at 144 (these countries are Algeria, Barbados, Belize,
Benin, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Libeda,
Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Is-
lands, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe).
67. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 4, para. 2(g), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 662
(1989). Parties are required to set technical guidelines for environmentally sound management
at their first meeting, which is to take place prior to transfer of the wastes. See id. art, 4, para.
8, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 663 (1989).
68. Id. art. 4, para. 10, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 663 (1989).
69. Id




Article 4 also prohibits the export or import of hazardous or other
wastes to or from any country that is not a party to the Convention.'
However, article 11 of the Convention allows parties to enter into bilat-
eral, multilateral, or regional agreements for the import or export of haz-
ardous or other wastes with any country, regardless of whether that
country is a party to the Convention.73 These agreements must not,
however, derogate from the environmentally sound management of haz-
ardous or other wastes as required by the Convention.74
Article 4 also allows parties to strengthen the Convention's provi-
sions. The article states that, "[nothing in this Convention shall prevent
a Party from imposing additional requirements that are consistent with
the provisions of this Convention .... ',71 The parties may add any addi-
tional requirements that they deem proper so long as they do not weaken
the Convention.
The Convention allows transboundary movements of wastes by par-
ties to the Convention in two situations: either the export state lacks the
technical capacity and necessary facilities to dispose of the wastes domes-
tically in an environmentally sound manner, or the import country re-
quires the wastes to fuel its recycling or recovery industries. If neither of
these two criteria are satisfied, however, the Convention allows the trans-
fer if the parties agree upon and comply with terms that do not derogate
from the Convention's objectives.76
If a transfer of wastes is not prohibited by the Convention, the par-
ties must comply with the Convention's notice and consent provisions in
order to effectuate the transfer. Article 6, titled Transboundary Move-
ments between Parties, sets forth these notice and consent provisions.
The article requires the exporting country to notify competent authority
71. Id See also id art. 2, at 42-43, reprinted in 28 LLM. 657, 662-63 (1989).
72. Id. art. 4, para. 5, reprinted in 28 IL.M. 657, 662 (1989).
73. Id. art. 11, para. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 668 (1989)
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 5, Parties may enter into
bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or arrangements regarding trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes with Parties or non-Parties
provided that such agreements or arrangements do not derogate from the environ-
mentally sound management of hazardous wastes and other wastes as required by
this Convention. These agreements or arrangements shall stipulate provisions which
are not less environmentally sound than those provided for by this Convention in
particular taking into account the interests of developing countries.
74. Id For the definition of the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes,
see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
75. Id art. 4, para. 11, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 663 (1989).
76. Id art. 4, para. 9, reprinted in 28 I.LM. 657, 663 (1989).
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in both the importing state and in any nation through which the wastes
will be transported.77 The notification must detail all movements of the
wastes, including: the reason for export; the generator of the wastes; the
disposer and intended carriers of the wastes; information relating to in-
surance, physical description, and quantity of the wastes; and the infor-
mation transmitted to the exporter upon which the disposer based its
belief that the wastes will be managed in an environmentally sound
manner.
78
Prior to the movement of the wastes, the competent authority of the
state of export must receive from the importer state written consent for
the transfer, and confirmation that a contract has been executed between
the party exporting the wastes and the disposer in the importer state.
This notice specifies the means of environmentally sound management.79
Export states must also obtain written consent from the states of transit
prior to the shipment.8 0 This consent provision may be waived, however,
if a transit state is silent for sixty days after notification.8
The specific notification regulations in article 6 may be avoided if
hazardous wastes are shipped regularly to the same disposer through the
same customs offices.82 Article 6, section 6 provides for general notice if
repeatedly shipped wastes have consistent physical and chemical charac-
teristics. 83 The Convention does not define what constitutes general no-
tice. Once again, the parties are allowed to define the Convention's
operative terms.
8 4
If a waste transaction occurs without proper notice and consent, it is
an illegal transfer under article 9.85 If wastes are illegally transferred, the
exporter state must either provide for environmentally sound disposal
elsewhere or re-import the wastes.8 6 The Convention does not set forth
penalties for illegal trade. Instead, article 9 requires each party to intro-
77. Id. art. 6, para. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 664 (1989).
78. Id. annex V(A), at 85-86, reprinted in 28 LL.M. 657, 682-83 (1989).
79. Id. art. 6, para. 3, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 664 (1989).
80. Id. art. 6, para. 4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 664-65 (1989).
81. Id.
82. Id. art. 6, paras. 6-8, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 665 (1989).
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. art. 9, para. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 666 (1989).
86. Id. art. 9, para. 2, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 666-67 (1989). If, however, the transfer
is deemed illegal due to conduct of the importer state or the disposer, the importer state must
ensure environmentally sound disposal of the wastes. Id. art. 9, para. 3, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
657, 667 (1989). If responsibility for illegal traffic cannot be assigned, then the parties are
required to cooperate in order to dispose of the wastes in an environmentally sound manner.
Id. art. 9, para. 4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 667 (1989).
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duce domestic legislation to prevent and punish illegal traffic. 7
Article 6, section 9 requires every waste transfer to be followed by a
paper trail.8" Each person who takes charge of a transboundary move-
ments of hazardous or other wastes must sign the movement document.8 9
In addition, the disposer in the importing state must inform the exporter
and the exporter state's competent authority of receipt of the wastes and
completion of disposal.90 Article 6 also requires that transboundary
movements of hazardous or other wastes be covered by insurance, bond,
or other guarantees specified by the importer state or any transit state.9'
A controversial obligation of the parties is the duty to re-import
wastes that may not be disposed of in accordance with provisions agreed
upon by the parties. Article 8 states that when a transboundary move-
ments of wastes cannot be completed in accordance with the parties'
agreed-upon terms, the exporter state must make alternative arrange-
ments for environmentally sound disposal.92 The export state has ninety
days to arrange for proper disposal of the wastes from the time the im-
port state notifies the export state and the UNEP Secretariat that the
wastes may not be disposed of in an environmentally sound manner. Af-
ter the ninety-day period, the exporter state is responsible for reimport of
the wastes.93
IM. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Convention has been criticized from all sides. Developed na-
tios, including the United States, hesitate to sign the Convention be-
cause they find some provisions too strict.9 4 Lesser developed nations
and international environmental groups feel that the Convention is not
stringent enough, and desire an outright ban on transboundary move-
ments of hazardous wastes.95
A. United States Regulations
The United States generates more than 250 million tons of hazard-
87. Id art. 9, para. 5, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 667 (1989).
88. Bollag, Hazardous Waste Is a Foreign Matter, CHEM. WEEK, Dec. 7, 1988, at 45.
89. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 6, para. 9, reprinted in 28 LLM. 657, 665
(1989).
90. Id
91. Id art. 6, para. 11, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 665 (1989).
92. Id. art. 8, at 52, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 665 (1989).
93. Id
94. Greenhouse, supra note 46, at Al, col. 1.
95. [2 No. 4] GREENPEACE UPDATE, supra note 11, at 2.
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ous wastes each year.96 Of those wastes, 160,000 tons are exported and
this number is increasing. 97 In 1980, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) received twelve notifications of waste exports.98 In 1988
this figure increased to 638. 99 EPA regulations governing export of haz-
ardous wastes have been in effect since 1986,1°° but have failed to slow
the export or production of wastes. In spite of this failure, the United
States has declined to implement legislation that would ratify the Con-
vention, asserting that the provisions are too strict. 10
The United States became the first country to regulate the export of
hazardous wastes through domestic legislation when Congress enacted
the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) 0 2 to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 0 a The
HSWA amendments prohibit the export of hazardous wastes unless the
exporter notifies the EPA, and the import state government consents to
receipt of the wastes." 4 The notification must be in writing and signed
by the exporter, and must include: a description of the wastes to be ex-
ported; the method of transportation, treatment, and storage or disposal;
and the name and address of the ultimate treatment or storage facility. 10
Within thirty days of receiving the notification, the EPA, in conjunction
with the State Department, must notify the import state of the proposed
transboundary movement. 0 6 The EPA notification must include a re-
quest for written consent or objection to the shipment from the importer
and describe the U.S. federal regulations that would apply to the treat-
ment, storage, and disposal of the hazardous wastes if it were retained in
the United States.'07
96. Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 23 (statement of John Conyers, Jr.).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 47 (statement of Scott A. Hajost).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 50 (statement of Scott A. Hajost).
101. The United States signed the Convention on March 22, 1990, at 11:30, just one half an
hour before the period for signatures closed.
102. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat,
3221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. 1990)).
103. E. Spitalnik, Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Waste-Problems and Proposed
Solutions, at E.9 (paper presented at the Second Asian Conference on Hazardous Waste Dis-
posal on Nov. 16, 1988, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) (Ms. Spitalnik was a Fulbright Research
Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore at the time she wrote this
paper).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a) (Supp. 1990).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(c) (Supp. 1990).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d) (Supp. 1990). The State Department's primary roles arc transla-
tion and information transmission.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d) (Supp. 1990). The United States does not currently have a provi-
sion that prevents waste shipments to an importing country that has waste disposal standards
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Once the EPA receives the proposed import state's consent or objec-
tion, it has another thirty days to notify the exporter of the response
received.' If the state of import consents, the exporter may proceed.
The written notice and consent must be contained in the EPA Manifest,
which must accompany the shipment. °9
In contrast to the Convention, the consent of transit states after no-
tification by the exporter is not a prerequisite for the shipment of the
hazardous wastes. The EPA will, however, notify the exporter of any
transit country's responses, and urge exporters to reroute if a transit state
objects to the shipment." 0
Similar to the Convention, the RCRA also provides for outside
agreements between the United States and import state governments, so
long as the agreement contains specific provisions consistent with the
RCRA's notice and consent scheme."' The United States has such
agreements with Mexico" 2 and Canada.' 1 3 Finally, the RCRA requires
that exporters of hazardous wastes file certified annual reports with the
EPA summarizing the types, quantities, frequency, and ultimate destina-
tion of all hazardous wastes exported that year.
1 4
B. Comparison Between United States Regulations and the
Convention
Significant differences between the RCRA and the Convention have
prevented the United States from ratifying the Convention.' 1 5 First, the
U.S. definition of hazardous wastes for regulatory purposes is not as in-
clusive as the Convention definition. The RCRA does not include infec-
less stringent than those of the United States. M. Gade, supra note 39, at 21. This type of
provision is sometimes referred to as the "no less strict standard." Id. The Basel Convention's
final draft did not include a proposed "no less strict standard" provision. The provision was
allegedly removed because of pressure from the United States. Greenhouse, supra note 46, at
BlI, col. 3; see also [2 No. 3] GREENPEAcE UPDATE, supra note 37, at 5. The United States
believes that the provision is too stringent because it may impose a de facto ban on waste
exports. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(e) (Supp. 1990).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1990).
110. Semenoff, Foreign Trade in Trash? Exporting Hazardous Waste, 4 NAT. REsoURCES
& ENV'T 14, 17 (1989).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f) (Supp. 1990).
112. Agreement on the Transboaundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous
Substances, Nov. 12, 1986, United States-Mexico, 26 I.L.M. 25 (1987).
113. Agreement Concerning Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Oct. 28,
1986, United States-Canada, referenced in 26 I.L.M. 593 (1987).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(g) (Supp. 1990). The reporting requirements also apply to the
outside agreements provided for in subsection (f).
115. See Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 47-51 (statement of Scott A. Hajost).
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tious wastes, municipal garbage, or ash from garbage incineration in the
definition of hazardous wastes.' 16 The RCRA defines hazardous wastes
broadly as solid wastes which may "cause or significantly contribute to
an increase in mortality or... serious... illnesses... or pose a substan-
tial present or potential harm to human health or the environment when
improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise
managed." ' 7 Using this definition, the EPA has developed regulations
that list the types of wastes and their constituents that it considers haz-
ardous.11 s These regulations also include four characteristics defining
hazardous wastes: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and extractive pro-
cedure toxicity. 19
However, the Waste Export Control Act, a pending House of Rep-
resentatives bill, includes a "no less strict standard" provision.'"2 The
Waste Export Control Act, if passed, will amend the Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Act 21 and will implement the Convention's provisions. The bill re-
quires bilateral agreements between the United States and any country to
which it exports wastes.122 Export facilities that do not meet disposal
standards equivalent to those required by U.S. law would be prohib-
ited.'23 Applicants would be required to provide enough information
about the transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of the wastes
to satisfy the EPA Administrator that the overall disposal would be in a
manner that matches or surpasses U.S. standards. 124 In addition, unlike
the Convention, the bill gives U.S. officials access to inspect foreign
facilities. 125
The EPA opposes the "no less strict standard" provision because it
contends that the United States has the highest environmental standards
in the world and the provision would operate as a de facto ban on all U.S.
hazardous waste exports.126 The EPA instead favors applying the Con-
vention's standard of "environmentally sound management" to the dis-
116. Id at 29 (statement of Mike Synar, Representative in Congress from the State of
Oklahoma).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (Supp. 1990).
118. 40 C.F.R. § 707 (1989).
119. Id.
120. H.R. 2525, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 134 CONG. REc. S11-76 (daily ed. July 27, 1989).
The bill was first introduced in 1988 at S. 2598, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CoNG. Rac. S8809-
10 (daily ed. June 29, 1988).





126. Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 50 (statement of Scott A. Hajost).
[V/ol. 14
The Basel Convention
posal in the importing country.12 7
A second difference between the U.S. regulations and the Conven-
tion lies in the requirements. While the Convention requires consent of
transit states unless expressly waived, the RCRA has no requirement for
consent of transit states. In addition, the Convention has specific provi-
sions for consent by import states for transfers, but the United States
does not require prior notice and clearance for waste imports.1
2
A final significant point of departure in U.S. law is that the RCRA
does not expressly obligate the exporter to reimport hazardous wastes
when the parties cannot comply with the terms of the contract. This
requirement contrasts with the Convention's article 8, which requires
reimport of hazardous wastes that will not be disposed of in accordance
with the terms agreed upon by the parties. However, when a shipment
cannot be delivered, the United States Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.) requires the exporter to instruct the transporter to return the
waste shipment to the exporter or to a designated facility.'29 Unlike the
Convention, the C.F.R. regulations do not require reimport if the terms
of the agreement between the parties cannot be upheld, or if the wastes
will not be disposed of in an environmentally sound manner.
C. Environmentalist Criticism and a Rebuttal
While the United States has failed to ratify the Convention because
it alleges that the Convention's provisions are too stringent to allow for
compliance, other opponents of the Convention feel that a stronger in-
strument is needed. 130 Greenpeace, the National Resources Defense
Council, and the Organization of African Unity argue that the provisions
of the Convention legitimize hazardous waste trade, and that a complete
ban on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes is the only way to
ensure safety and to minimize hazardous waste production. 
13
The Convention's provisions allow for a party to enforce a de facto
ban on all hazardous waste export.' 32 However, the opponents of the
Convention are unwilling to accept such a compromise. Those advocat-
127. Id.
128. Atkinson, supra note 1, at 47.
129. 40 C.F.R. § 262.54(g) (1989).
130. Bollag, supra note 88, at 45.
131. Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 156-57 (statement of Jim Vallette).
132. Pursuant to article 4 of the Basel Convention, parties that wish to ban all hazardous
waste imports may do so. Other parties must then prohibit the export of hazardous wstes to
parties which have prohibited the import of the same. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 4,
para. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 659 (1989).
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ing a complete ban demand that the Convention mandate a complete ban
immediately.
A key criticism of the Convention is that waste production is not
discouraged because the Convention's provisions allow inexpensive dis-
posal of wastes in importing countries.1 33 Proponents of a complete ban
argue that a ban is the only way to ensure that overall production of
hazardous wastes is decreased.1
3 4
However, this criticism fails to examine the possibility of decreased
waste production due to the increased costs of waste transfers under the
Convention, the cost and difficulty of developing internal waste treat-
ment sites, and the problems that lesser developed countries may face if
forced to comply with a complete ban. Arguing in favor of the Conven-
tion, Tolba, Secretary of UNEP, feels that the Convention will make in-
ternational transfers so costly and difficult that it will operate as an
incentive to decrease waste production. 135 Imposing a complete ban
would limit waste producers' legal alternatives to either increasing dispo-
sal facilities in the home state or reducing hazardous wastes at point of
production. Developing new disposal and treatment facilities in coun-
tries currently producing large amounts of hazardous wastes is becoming
increasingly more costly and difficult.' 36 For exunple, in the United
States, EPA regulations significantly limit the possible sites for hazard-
ous waste treatment and disposal facilities.' 37 In addition, heightened
public awareness of the danger of hazardous waste facilities has resulted
in a widespread "not in my backyard" attitude, which makes it more
difficult for waste producers to locate new sites for facilities. 138 Thus, the
only alternative for waste producers may in fact be to minimize the
amount of hazardous wastes produced.
The Convention also addresses the need to decrease waste produc-
tion by calling on parties to "ensure that the generation of hazardous
wastes and other wastes.., is reduced to a minimum."'' 39 Further, the
Convention also requires individual parties and conferences of the parties
133. M. Gade, supra note 39, at 18.
134. Parker, The Path of Least Resistance, ENrVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 5. See also [2
No. 3] GREENPEACE UPDATE, supra note 37, at 3-4.
135. See O'Sullivan, supra note 28, at 21.
136. Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 110 (statement of Donald B. Bright, Chief
Executive Officer of Environmental Audit, Inc.) (Environmental Audit, Inc. is a corporation
dealing with a number of hazardous management projects).
137. It
138. Id




to periodically review and evaluate the implementation of the Conven-
tion.1' Specifically, the Convention requires the parties to have a confer-
ence within one year after the Convention goes into force, again within
three years from that date, and to meet again at least every six years
thereafter. 4 The conferences must discuss possibilities for waste mini-
mization and consider complete or partial bans of transboundary move-
ments. 42 Convention opponents feel that a mandate for waste
minimization is futile without a complete ban. However, by calling on
parties to reduce production levels, and making it incumbent upon the
parties to minimize waste production, the goal to reduce hazardous waste
production can be met.
Supporters of a total ban argue that such a ban would halt dumping
on lesser developed nations that are forced to import wastes out of neces-
sity.143 Greenpeace argues that the Convention will not prevent devel-
oped countries from dumping on developing nations because obtaining
the signature of one lesser developed nation's government official, as re-
quired by the Convention, is an easy task.'" If this is the case, lesser
developed countries with willing "competent authorities" choosing to
trade in hazardous wastes for foreign currency will not be hindered by
the Convention's provisions. However, to argue that these notice and
consent provisions will not reduce the amount of "dumping" on lesser
developed nations is to assume that the developing countries' competent
authority will agree to accept a hazardous waste shipment for foreign
currency regardless of its impact on the environment. Thus, the argu-
ment can only be supported based upon an assumption of corruption in
the importer state's government.
Further, a total ban on the export of hazardous wastes would de-
prive countries of their sovereign right to import on behalf of their citi-
zens. 4 ' International law recognizes that a nation's decision regarding
what products it imports for its citizens is within that country's sovereign
powers.'" Countries may consider a convention calling for a complete
140. Id. art. 4, para. 13, reprinted in 28 LL.M. 657, 663 (1989).
141. Id. art. 15, at 61-62, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 670-71 (1989).
142. Id art. 15, para. 7, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 671 (1989).
143. [2 No. 3] GREENPEACE UPDATE, supra note 37, at 1.
144. Id. at 3. The Convention calls for the signature of "one governmental authority desig-
nated by a Party to be responsible, within such geographical areas as the Party may think fit,
for receiving the notification of transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes,
and any information related to it, and for responding to such a notification, as provided in
Article 6." Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 2, para. 6, reprinted in 28 LLM. 657, 660
(1989).
145. M. Gade, supra note 39, at 24.
146. Id.
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ban and creating a supranational police force to be an invasion of their
sovereignty.147 The Convention's current provisions, which provide for a
de facto total ban, avoid this issue and allow each country to make its
own decision regarding waste import.
In contrast to the claims by Convention opponents, major waste-
producing countries dispose of only a small percentage of hazardous
wastes in lesser developed countries. 48 Tolba, Secretary of UNEP,
states that the notion that developed countries are dumping their wastes
on lesser developed countries is a "misunderstanding," and that eighty
percent of all hazardous wastes are exchanged among developed coun-
tries.149 Of the hazardous wastes exported from the United States in
1988, over ninety percent went to Canada and Mexico. These two coun-
tries have the technical capacity to dispose of the wastes in an environ-
mentally sound manner.1 50
Moreover, the Convention has safeguards which are designed for
the protection of less developed countries. Pursuant to article 4, section
13, parties are required to review and consider reduction of the amount
of wastes exported to developing countries.151 In addition, the Conven-
tion's provision for bilateral agreements requires parties to account for
the interests of developing countries.
152
Finally, a total ban may actually harm developing nations more
than it would help them. Many developing nations will need to export
wastes in the future.1 53 Even the United States, which has produced haz-
ardous wastes for years, is to this date attempting to find adequate dispo-
sal and incineration techniques. In fact, many countries, including
Singapore and Egypt, are already exporting hazardous wastes.154 Some
countries, such as Ireland, produce so little hazardous wastes that the
small amount incinerated does not justify the cost of developing a facil-
147. Nanda & Bailey, Export of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Technology: Challenge
for International Environmental Law, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. 155, 159 (1988).
148. See Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 44 (statement of Scott A. Hajost),
149. O'Sullivan, supra note 28, at 22.
150. Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 55 (statement of William A. Nitze).
151. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 4, para. 13, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 663
(1989).
152. Ia art. 11, para. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 668 (1989) ("These agreements or
arrangements shall stipulate provisions which are not less environmentally sound than those
provided for by this Convention in particular taking into account the interests of developing
countries.") See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
153. See Aeppel, Curbing Abuses in Export of Waste, Christian Sci. Mon., Mar. 24, 1989, at
4, col. 4 (quoting Mostafa Tolba that in the interest of sound environmental management
developing nations will be required to export their own wastes).
154. See E. Spitalnik, supra note 103, at E.7; J. VALLETrE, supra note 7, at 36.
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ity.'1" A total ban would therefore make superior technology for dispo-
sal and incineration of hazardous wastes unavailable to some
countries. 
156
Further, a total ban would limit the possibilities for recycling. Only
developed nations have the ability to recycle the bulk of hazardous
wastes."5 7 WidL a limited number of countries performing hazardous
waste recovery and re-use operations, a complete ban on exports would
lessen recycling possibilities. 158
Another argument posed by Convention critics who favor a total
ban on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes is that the limited
funds available can be more effectively focused on borders to stop all
transport of wastes. 15 9 Under the Convention, funding must be allocated
for administration of the entire program.lec A total ban would concen-
trate funds on the borders and focus enforcement actions on the outright
offenders, rather than on less significant paperwork violations. 61
A total ban may be easier and less costly than enforcement of the
Convention's notice and consent provisions. However, Tolba estimates
that 750,000 dollars a year will be sufficient to staff the Secretariat, the
central enforcement authority under the Convention. 162 This figure is
insignificant in comparison to the overall costs of hazardous waste trans-
portation and disposal, coupled with the cost to the environment when
wastes are improperly managed. Thus, the argument that the Conven-
tion is a more expensive means of enforcement than is a total ban is less
than persuasive. Cost is not the only factor to be considered for develop-
ing a regulatory scheme, and does not by itself justify an outright ban.
For example, in setting pollution control standards in major environmen-
tal legislation, the U.S. EPA does not take into account the costs of at-
taining the standards.' 6 3 The EPA refuses to put a price tag on human
155. Passing the Muck, EcoNoMIST, Aug. 19, 1989, at 41.
156. M. Gade, supra note 39, at 23.
157. Id Many countries do not have the technology to recycle certain wastes and therefore
export those wastes. For example, the United States exports precious metals for recycling. See
Waste Export Control Bill, supra note 22, at 58 (statement of William A. Nitze).
158. Hazardous waste recycling depends on the ability to segregate recoverable wastes
from other process wastes. Recoverable wastes can be reused in the production process. S.
EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 5.13-5.15.
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id at 25.
162. See Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 16, at 63-64, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 671-
73 (1989); O'Sullivan, supra note 28, at 22.
163. See Lead Industries Association, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
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health when setting major environmental standards.1 " This is not to
suggest that costs of enforcement should be ignored in setting environ-
mental regulations; however, an effective system of controlling hazardous
waste transport should not be eliminated merely because it is not the
most cost-efficient alternative.
1 65
A worldwide ban on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes
would undoubtedly reduce the danger to human health and the environ-
ment. However, the arguments against a total ban are convincing
enough to mandate the Convention's resolution of allowing each country
to decide for itself whether a ban on import and export of hazardous
wastes is appropriate.
Convention opponents argue that the Convention is not only too
expensive, but that it also will be ineffective; unchecked transboundary
movements of hazardous wastes will continue in spite of the Conven-
tion's provisions. 166 Nonsiguatories may continue trade among them-
selves. While countries that desire the protection of the Convention will
be able to benefit from it, the goals of worldwide reduction at the point of
production and the control of transfers of hazardous wastes will not be
met if the required minimum number of countries ratify the Convention.
An even greater problem in meeting the Convention's goals lies in
the Convention's provision allowing bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments among countries. 167 These outside agreements provide parties
with an easy method of evading the Convention. These agreements may
be made between two parties to the Convention or between a party and a
nonparty.168 The only requirement imposed on these agreements is that
the nations involved comply with the environmentally sound manage-
ment of hazardous waste techniques required by the Convention. 169 As
discussed above, environmentally sound management is not currently a
clearly defined term. 170 The Convention states that the Secretariat must
denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980) (the court considered an air quality -,tandard for lead under thc
Clean Air Act).
164. Id at 1153.
165. Under the Convention, the UNEP Secretariat will be the central enforcement author-
ity. See Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 16, at 63-64, reprinted in 28 I.L,M. 657, 671-73
(1989).
166. Parker, supra note 134, at 5.
167. Article 11 of the Convention states that "[plarties may enter into bilateral, multilat-
eral, or regional agreements or arrangements regarding transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes or other wastes with Parties or non-Parties... ." Basel Convention, supra note 27, art,
11, para. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 668 (1989).
168. Id
169. Id
170. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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be notified of these agreements. 7 1 Whether the Secretariat will have veto
power if the agreement does not appear to meet the environmentally
sound management requirement is unclear. Thus, the provisions may
allow parties to avoid the Convention's specific regulations.
In addition, bilateral agreements can operate to remove the special
protections the Convention provides for lesser developed countries. De-
veloping countries in need of foreign currency might be willing to import
hazardous wastes through bilateral agreements that are not as favorable
to them as the Convention's provisions. If a country, desperate for cur-
rency, enters into an unfavorable bilateral agreement, it foregoes the
Convention's inherent protections. In foregoing these safeguards, the
country may place the health and safety of its citizens in danger. 172 As
stated earlier, arguments should not be based upon an assumption of cor-
ruption on the part of officials in less developed countries, but if the pro-
vision allowing outside agreements is removed, countries that have
ratified the Convention will not have the opportunity to circumvent the
Convention's provisions.
Allowing bilateral agreements contradicts Tolba's stated goal of cre-
ating a system so costly and complicated that countries will choose not to
export wastes. It is unlikely that parties entering into outside agreements
will subject themselves to the formalities of the Convention. Thus, trans-
fers will not be the encumbrance envisioned by Tolba. Minimization of
waste production and reduction of trade through the creation of a com-
plicated system will not be achieved.
General enforcement of the Convention's provisions is another diffi-
cult matter. The Convention requires an extensive amount of paperwork
and correspondence between governments."7 3 Coordinating the paper
work for each transfer will be a tremendous task. The Convention estab-
lishes a Secretariat as the key enforcement official.174 However, each
government is also responsible for enforcing the provisions of the Con-
vention.' 71 In addition, monitoring illegal transfers may be difficult. The
171. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 11, para. 2, reprinted in 28 I.LM. 657, 668
(1989).
172. See E. Spitalnik, supra note 103, at E.19.
173. For each transfer, there must be a written notification to the state of import and to
any states of transit, and a written response to the state of export from the state of import and
any states of transit. A written manifest must accompany the actual transfer. Additionally, a
"movement" document which is to contain the signature of any person who takes charge of
the wastes must accompany the waste. See Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 11, at 56,
reprinted in 28 LL.M. 657, 668 (1989).
114. Id art. 16, at 63-64, reprinted in 28 LL.M. 657, 671-73 (1989).
175. Handl & Lutz, An International Policy Perspective on the Trade of Hazardous Materi-
als and Technologies, 30 HARv. INT'L LJ. 351, 361 (1989).
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United States, for example, has been unsuccessful in implementing a na-
tionwide monitoring program to spot check international waste ship-
ments, and violations of domestic laws have been frequent although there
have been domestic laws applicable to waste transfers since 1984.176
Enforcement will not be a fatal problem, however, if hazardous
waste transfers are opened up to public scrutiny. Because the Conven-
tion deals with what many see as a moral issue and with what is unques-
tionably a health issue, 177 the most effective means to assure compliance
is to subject the transporters to the pressures of informed public opin-
ion.178 The Convention requires reports to be circulated to designated
government authorities and the Convention's Secretariat. These docu-
ments will provide an effective monitoring system if made available.
A final criticism of the Convention is that the vague language cre-
ates loopholes. 179 First, the definition of the term "disposal" is unclear.
Disposal is defined as: "operations which do not lead to the possibility of
resource recovery, recycling, reclamation, direct re-use or alternative
uses." ' Reusable and recyclable wastes are not subject to the Conven-
tion's provisions because they do not fall within the definition of dispo-
sal. 181 The Convention, however, does not specify what constitutes reuse
or recycling. Distinguishing between exports for disposal and for re-
cycling is almost impossible and can easily lead to sham recycling.
18 2
Possibly, even legitimate recycling will often leave hazardous residuals
which require proper disposal.
18 3
To resolve this problem, the Convention should be amended to
cover all transfers of hazardous or other wastes. This would increase the
Secretariat's enforcement responsibilities, but would eliminate avoidance
of the Convention through sham recycling.
A second problem is defining the "environmentally sound manage-
ment" of wastes. The Convention's guideline, requiring members to take
practicable steps to ensure that human health and the environment are
176. M. Gade, supra note 39, at 9.
177. See Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 30 (statement of Howard Wolpe, Reprc-
sentative in Congress from the State of Michigan).
178. Handl & Lutz, supra note 175, at 373.
179. Greenhouse, supra note 47, at B1 1, col. 4.
180. Basel Convention, supra note 27, annex IV, § A, at 83, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 681
(1989) (emphasis added). See also id. annex IV, § B at 84, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 682
(1989).
181. See id annex IV, at 83-84, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 681-82 (1989).




protected, is not specific enough to advise the parties of their
responsibilities.
Parties are required to set technical guidelines for environmentally
sound management at their first meeting, prior to any transfer of
wastes.' However, developing and applying criteria for sound manage-
ment is a difficult task because the countries negotiating may have differ-
ent levels of technical knowledge and different views on which safety
requirements are necessary.185 This is especially true if the negotiations
involve a lesser developed country that does not currently have guide-
lines for waste disposal. Countries with stringent waste disposal regula-
tions will be reluctant to conclude that a disposal with less stringent
standards is sound management of wastes. 
1 6
Despite these problems, the Convention must establish standards for
sound management if it is to be an effective method of control. These
standards should allow flexibility in determining "sound management"
depending on the conditions surrounding disposal in the importing coun-
try. The U.S. EPA is considering which criteria will be used in determin-
ing whether wastes are being managed properly. These criteria could be
looked to by the parties as a model, since the United States currently has
the most stringent domestic legislation. The tentative proposal includes
the following considerations: regulatory programs to control wastes, such
as inspection and enforcement provisions; technical design of the facili-
ties; daily operation of the facility; and the facilities' compliance
history.
187
The Convention should be amended to include criteria similar to the
EPA's tentative proposal as well as minimum standards for each of the
criteria. For example, the Convention could require that there be a regu-
latory program in existence that addresses the following: (1) inspection
of disposal facilities to ensure adequate long-term storage or incineration
of wastes; (2) enforcement of the Convention's regulations; and (3) facil-
ity compliance over a specified time period. Environmentally sound
management is at the heart of the Convention and should be addressed
by establishing these criteria and standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problems resulting from transboundary niovements of hazard-
184. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 4, para. 8, reprinted in 28 .L.M. 657, 663
(1989).
185. M. Gade, supra note 39, at 14.
186. Cf Waste Export Control, supra note 22, at 51-52 (statement of Scott A. Hajost).
187. Id. at 50 (statement of Scott A. Hajost).
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ous wastes will not be solved without effective international regulation
adhered to by all nations. The Convention is the first international in-
strument attempting to control hazardous waste transport.
The amendments I propose should be made to the Convention in the
mandatory conference of the parties which will meet within one year of
the date the Convention goes into force.188 As Mostafa Tolba stated,
"this treaty was not designed to be a static instrument, but one that could
be continuously reviewed, adjusted, and strengthened." '189
In sum, I first propose that the conference should delete any allow-
ance for outside agreements. If the Convention is to be effective, all haz-
ardous waste transfers must be subject to its provisions. Second, the
provision excluding wastes destined for recycling or reuse should also be
deleted. All transfers must be covered for the Convention to be effective.
Finally, the conference should specify criteria and minimum standards
for the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes.
These changes would render the Convention a reasonable common
ground between the strict instrument advocated by some, and the free
commercial trade desired by others.
188. Basel Convention, supra note 27, art. 15, para. 1, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657, 670
(1989).
189. O'Sullivan, supra note 28, at 22.
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